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INTRODUCTION
Hypnotizability, or hypnotic susceptibility
(Green et al., 2005), is a good predictor
of the response to suggestions in and out
of hypnosis (Meyer and Lynn, 2011). It
can be measured by scales (Sheehan and
McConkey, 1982) allowing to classify sub-
jects as high (highs), medium (mediums),
and low (lows) hypnotizable by indicating
the individual ability to modify experience
and behavior according to the suggestions’
content and to feel that this occurs inde-
pendently of will.
In the ordinary state of consciousness,
highs and lows can be discriminated by the
predictability of their electroencephalo-
graphic (EEG) dynamics, while the sev-
eral studies performed through spectral
analysis of EEG failed to indicate clear-
cut discrimination criteria (Madeo et al.,
2013). Imaging studies (Hoeft et al., 2012)
have associated high hypnotizability with
greater functional connectivity between
the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, an
executive-control region, and the salience
network (dorsal anterior cingulate cortex,
anterior insula, amygdala, ventral stria-
tum) involved in detection and process-
ing of relevant information (Figure 1).
This is consistent with the evidence that
highs tend to become deeply absorbed in
any task of everyday life (Tellegen and
Atkinson, 1974; Kihlstrom et al., 1989);
nonetheless, the theory attributing the
highs’ peculiar ability of focusing atten-
tion on selected internal or external objects
as the basis of hypnotic responding (Raz,
2005; Szekely et al., 2010) has been chal-
lenged by neuropsychological and genetic
studies. The former have denied any asso-
ciation between various attentional abil-
ities and hypnotisability (Varga et al.,
2011), have shown only higher arousal
in highs (Castellani et al., 2007) and
have suggested that the highs’ attention
is more stable (less distractible) rather
than more flexible than the lows’ one
(Jamieson and Sheehan, 2004; Egner et al.,
2005); genetic studies (Presciuttini et al.,
2014) have refuted the hypothesis that
reduced dopamine catabolism associated
with polymorphism of the brain Catechol-
O-Methil-Transferase (COMT) may be
responsible for the highs’ attentional abil-
ities, as no difference between highs and
lows has been found in COMT polymor-
phism (Szekely et al., 2010). Nonetheless,
theoretically, higher dopaminergic tone
could be sustained in highs by other
mechanisms such as different receptors
density/distribution/sensitivity, dopamine
production, and catabolism by the Mono-
Amino-Oxidase system.
Since the very beginning of my research
activity I have focused my interest on the
physiological correlates of hypnotisability
rather than on its psychological factors
possibly accounting for hypnotic respond-
ing (Killeen and Nash, 2003; Dienes
et al., 2009; Lynn and Green, 2011).
In fact, I considered that the existence
of a trait influencing only one aspect
of behavior—the proneness to accept
suggestions—would be a serious chal-
lenge to common sense, all the more that
hypnotic performance was considered a
consequence of peculiar attentional abili-
ties (Raz, 2005), attention modulates sev-
eral sensorimotor processes (Woollacott
and Shumway-Cook, 2002; Ruff, 2013),
cognitive-emotional traits have been asso-
ciated with peculiar morphological char-
acteristics of cerebellar structures (Picerni
et al., 2013), and both the cerebellum and
basal ganglia are often involved in non-
motor functions (Stoodley, 2012; Leisman
and Melillo, 2013; Keren-Happuch et al.,
2014).
My intuition was correct. Indeed, I have
found hypnotizability-related differences
(Carli et al., 2006, 2008; Santarcangelo
et al., 2008, 2010; Menzocchi et al., 2010,
2012; Castellani et al., 2011; Scattina
et al., 2012) in many aspects of sensori-
motor integration in both the absence
(Table 1) (Collins and De Luca, 1993;
Caratelli et al., 2010; Mecacci et al., 2013)
and the presence of suggestions. I have
chosen the differences in postural con-
trol induced by imagined sensory alter-
ation (Carli et al., 2006; Santarcangelo
et al., 2010; Scattina et al., 2012) as the
object of this article. I will also show that
my physiological approach to the field
of hypnotizability allows to suggest that
the involuntariness reported by highs in
their response to sensory suggestions is
physiologically sustained and, thus, “real”
rather than only subjectively experienced
(Santarcangelo et al., 2010).
POSTURAL EFFECTS OF IMAGINED SENSORY
ALTERATION
The experience of involuntariness in hyp-
notic responding has been attributed by
neo-dissociative theories to dissociation
between experience or executive control
and behavior, and by socio-cognitive the-
ories to deep absorption in mental images
associated with high expectancy of behav-
ior congruent with the suggestions content
(Lynn and Green, 2011).
Different cortical activities have
been observed during active, passive
and hypnotically-induced movements
(Kosslyn et al., 2001; Blakemore et al.,
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic view of hypnotizability-related differences in the brain activity. ∗Structures and connections (arrows) possibly involved.
Table 1 | Sensori-motor integration in not hypnotized highs not receiving any suggestion.
SPINAL REFLEXES DURING LONG LASTING RELAXATION (Carli et al., 2008)
Habituation of the soleus muscle H reflex
Reduction of the F wave frequency of occurrence (right hand abductor digiti minimi*)
POSTURAL CONTROL*
Greater independence of peripheral information (Santarcangelo et al., 2008)
Larger range of body sway not associated with peripherally-induced correction (Santarcangelo et al., 2008)
Postural behavior similar to lows in highly demanding postural tasks (Caratelli et al., 2010; Mecacci et al., 2013)
WALKING DIRECTION DURING BLINDFOLDED LOCOMOTION (Menzocchi et al., 2010)
Larger variability in basal conditions
Scarce influence of tonic head rotation
HAPTIC EXPLORATION
More accurate angle reproduction (Menzocchi et al., 2012)
More frequent visual recognition of meaningless objects (Castellani et al., 2011)
*Stabilogram diffusion analysis (Collins and De Luca, 1993) revealed different internal models for postural control in highs and lows during suppression of vision
and alteration of the leg proprioceptive information (Santarcangelo et al., 2008). Nonetheless, highs were not less efficient than lows in maintaining balance when
postural conditions were highly demanding and required higher engagement of sensory feed-back mechanisms, as occurs on see-saw platforms (Caratelli et al.,
2010) and in one legged stance (Mecacci et al., 2013).
2003; Cardena et al., 2012), and the
observed activation of the inferior parietal
cortex has been assumed as responsible
for perceived involuntariness (Blakemore
et al., 2003), whereas physiological auto-
maticity in hypnotic responding has never
been demonstrated. I have approached
this topic through a number of postural
studies (Carli et al., 2006; Santarcangelo
et al., 2010; Scattina et al., 2012).
It is well-known that imagined and
physically- induced perceptions as well
as imagined and real voluntary move-
ments activate the same neural circuits,
although to different extent (Jeannerod,
2001; Kosslyn et al., 2001; Moulton and
Kosslyn, 2009; Munzert et al., 2009; Hétu
et al., 2013). Several observations suggest
a more effective activation of these circuits
in highs.
In fact, only highs exhibited a back-
ward body displacement (as expected on
the basis of the inertia law) while stand-
ing and receiving the instruction to imag-
ine that a carpet was under their feet and
was being abruptly pulled forward (Carli
et al., 2006). In this study, the expected
behavior was not explicitly described by
the suggestion script; in addition, par-
ticipants reported not to have predicted
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their movement on the basis of pertain-
ing physical laws and to have experienced
their backward sway as involuntary. Thus,
it appeared unlikely that their movement
was triggered by absorption/expectation,
as suggested by Kirsch and Lynn (1999),
but we did not have any objective evidence
of involuntariness.
In another study, during imagery of
procedural leg pain (Scattina et al., 2012),
that is while imagining that “the sur-
geon is taking out some pebbles from
the left calf, he is using tweezers, he
cannot avoid tearing away small pieces
of flesh. . . unfortunately there is no anes-
thetic. . . ,” only highs exhibited a postu-
ral response (larger and faster body sway
with respect to rest, displacement of the
Center of Pressure (CoP) toward the site
opposite to the imagined nociceptive stim-
ulation) congruent with the suggestion
administered and reported it as invol-
untary. Covariate analysis showed that
their body displacement was not com-
pletely accounted for by the vividness of
imagery, absorption in the task and per-
ceived pain intensity; in fact, the CoP dis-
placement toward the opposite side was
independent of all these factors. Thus,
again our findings challenged the hypoth-
esis that absorption/expectation may be
sufficient to account for the observed
motor response. Nonetheless, participants
may have been aware that pain in one leg
induces a displacement toward the other
leg and/or remember similar real situa-
tions, thus again we had no evidence of
involuntariness.
THE VESTIBULO-SPINAL REFLEX: A PROBE
FOR INVOLUNTARINESS
We designed an experiment to assess
whether the perception of involuntariness
may be sustained by physiological auto-
maticity (Santarcangelo et al., 2010). In
particular, we chose the vestibulo-spinal
reflex (VR) evoked by galvanic stimulation
of the labyrinth as a “probe for invol-
untariness.” In fact, the vestibular stimu-
lation induces body sway depending on
the head position with respect to the
body (Manzoni, 2005; Shaikh et al., 2005),
that is in the frontal plane with the par-
ticipant’s head directed forward and in
the sagittal plane with the head rotated
toward one side. This shift in the direction
of body sway depends on the cerebellar
integration of vestibular and neck proprio-
ceptive inputs (Kammermeier et al., 2009).
In addition, the VR earliest component
elicited in any head position is not mod-
ulated by expectancy (Guerraz and Day,
2005) and volition (Reynolds, 2010).
We elicited VR in highs and lows
with their head directed forward as well
as physically and imaginatively rotated
toward one side (“. . . please, imagine that
your head is rotated toward the right
side. . . you can see your chin aligned with
your shoulder. . . and feel the tension in
your neck muscles. . . ”) and observed that
only the highs’ VR earliest component
occurred in the sagittal plane for both
the real and imagined head rotation, in
spite of the similar absorption and vivid-
ness of imagery. Given the characteristics
of VR, we have to admit that imagery of
“rotated head” generated the same neu-
ral conditions associated with real head
rotation, despite the subjects could not
predict which neural circuits should be
activated/inhibited and the studied reflex
could not be voluntarily controlled. In
other words, highs can transform into
appropriate neural activations not only
the mental images of voluntary movement
and of selected perceptions (Jeannerod,
2001; Kosslyn et al., 2001; Moulton and
Kosslyn, 2009; Munzert et al., 2009; Hétu
et al., 2013), as observed in the gen-
eral population, but also the images of
sensory contexts whose neural correlates
cannot be predicted and controlled.The
highs’ experience of involuntariness may
reflect this “automatic” activation of neu-
ral circuits enabling these individuals to
change their internal model for postural
control according to their mental images.
This change does not require any disso-
ciative barrier (Dienes et al., 2009; Dell,
2010; Lynn and Green, 2011), is not
a consequence of deep absorption/high
expectancy (Lynn and Green, 2011), and
cannot be assimilated to the preparation of
voluntary movements (Custers and Aarts,
2010).
The highs’ deeper embodiment of the
image of rotated head, however, may
derive also from their preferential employ-
ment of the kinesthetic modality of
imagery. In fact, in line with earlier
findings (Carli et al., 2007), they more
often reported to have “felt the neck
muscles tension” rather than to have
“seen their chin in line with the shoul-
der”(Santarcangelo et al., 2010), and the
kinesthetic modality is more efficacious
than the visual one in the body represen-
tation (Shenton et al., 2004).
In contrast to the imagery of rotated
head, which consists of an entirely imag-
ined sensory context, the obstructive sug-
gestion of anesthesia, which requires only
the ability to attenuate/abolish the per-
ception of a physical stimulation, reduces
the amplitude of the VR earliest com-
ponent in both groups (Santarcangelo
et al., 2010), as observed for the sug-
gestion of analgesia during nociceptive
stimulation (Santarcangelo et al., 2013).
Thus, on the basis of the observed
hypnotizability-related capacity to trans-
form mental images into sensori-motor
physiological conditions, highs may repre-
sent the upper extreme of a continuum in
the ability to modulate neural conditions
through imagery.
RESPONSES TO SENSORY
SUGGESTIONS AND THE CEREBELLUM
Impaired performance at cerebellar tests
during suggestions of anesthesia had sug-
gested a cerebellar involvement in the
motor response to sensory suggestions, but
hypnotic relaxation may have influenced
the performance (Wallace and Hoyenga,
1981). It has been also shown that over-
activity in the cerebellum and in the pari-
etal cortex is associated with the misat-
tribution of actions to an external source
(Blakemore et al., 2003), but this report
did not consider a possible real, physiolog-
ically based involuntariness.
In our study of the imagery of rotated
head (Santarcangelo et al., 2010) the
embodiment of the mental image of
rotated head involuntarily produced is
likely to enable the cerebellum to act rou-
tinely on the imaginatively constructed
sensory information. Alternatively,
imagery-triggered top down signals may
change the cerebellar internal model
according to the mental images’ con-
tent. In both instances, the perceived
involuntariness would be physiologically
sustained. In contrast, in the studies on
imagery of leg pain (Scattina et al., 2012)
and of inertial backward falling (Carli
et al., 2006), in which the response to
suggestions could be expected and volun-
tarily controlled (despite the participants’
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subjective reports), real involuntariness
could be sustained by reduced cerebellar
inhibition (Groiss and Ugawa, 2013) of
motor cortices (Figure 1).
Together with parietal associative areal,
the cerebellum is likely to be responsi-
ble also for the different internal models
(Ito, 2006) for postural control observed
in highs and lows in the absence of sug-
gestions (Santarcangelo et al., 2008). It
should be also studied whether cerebel-
lar peculiarities may contribute to the
cognitive aspects of hypnotic responding
through vestibulo-coeruleus and rubro-




Studies of the post-occlusion flow-
mediated dilation (FMD) of the brachial
artery (Green et al., 2014) have indi-
cated greater availability of endothelial
nitric oxide (NO) in highs during men-
tal stress and nociceptive stimulation
(Jambrik et al., 2005). A quite important
question is whether, in these individu-
als, larger NO availability characterizes
also the brain vessels. In fact, the brain
endothelial NO is responsible for basal
vascular tone, interacts with other medi-
ators, and acts as a neurotransmitter after
diffusion to the extracellular compart-
ment. Thus, (Figure 1), in the whole brain,
endothelial NO could prime cascade pro-
cesses modulating the neuronal activity
in highs and lows differentially. In addi-
tion, in animals NO increases the release
of acetylcholine, decreases the dopamine
release and increases its metabolism; in
humans, larger endothelial NO availability
in hypnotizability-related circuits (Hoeft
et al., 2012) could account for the highs’
attentional characteristics (see Presciuttini
et al., 2014) and could be involved in the
cognitive aspects of hypnotizability.
In the cerebellumNO acts also as a neg-
ative regulator of granule cell precursor
proliferation, promotes survival and dif-
ferentiation of these neurons and regulates
bidirectional plasticity at parallel fiber-
Purkinje neuron synapses (Contestabile,
2012). Thus, in the cerebellum, NO could
be responsible for different functional
properties. On the whole, highs and lows
may exhibit NO-dependent different acti-
vation of sensory and associative regions
such as those belonging to the salience and
executive circuits, cerebellar inhibition of
the motor cortex, internal model for pos-
tural control.
In conclusion, our findings allow to
include hypnotizability among the indi-
vidual traits responsible for part of the
variability in postural control and indicate
that it may be involved in the construction
of individual sensorimotor selves. They
suggest a key role of the cerebellum in
hypnotic responding and go beyond psy-
chological theories by suggesting that the
involuntariness in action reported after a
few sensori-motor suggestions can be real
rather than merely experienced.
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